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A. Several of Respondent’s “Factual Statements” are not factual.
Respondent’s Brief contains an inaccurate factual assertion on page 3 in which it is
asserted that “[a]t the time of the accident, the drive shafts on the picking table were covered by
a metal guard.” 1 Respondent cites to its own Answer to Interrogatory No. 19 for this assertion.2
Appellants dispute the veracity of this allegation. As a matter of common sense, if the drive
shaft had been covered by a metal guard at the time of Ms. Gomez’s death, then her hair would
not have become caught in the drive shaft – but it did. Furthermore, this factual allegation as
contained in Crookham’s formal discovery responses and inserted into Respondent’s Brief is
contradicted by deposition testimony of the employee who actually built and installed the table.
In this regard, as previously argued in Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, 3 Jim Bennett testified that there was no metal guarding covering the drive shaft
underneath the table where Ms. Gomez actually got her hair caught:
Q.
A.

There is no other subsequent triangle then that goes under the machine, correct?
No. 4

Furthermore, OSHA cited and penalized Crookham as a result of its failure to put
machine guarding around the drive shaft underneath the table. Crookham did not dispute the
citation and paid the fine. 5 Also, Crookham’s own identified expert, Matthew Call, specifically
noted that the drive shaft underneath the table did not have machine guarding. 6

1

Respondent’s Brief, p. 3.
Id.
3
Clerk’s Record (“R”), p. 476-477 (at pp. 4-5).
4
Id., p. 645 (at p. 88, ll. 19-21)
5
Id., pp. 331-356.
6
Id., p. 358.
2
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Additionally, Respondent’s legal counsel admitted in oral argument at the summary
judgment hearing that the drive shaft under the table was not completely guarded:
When the tables were installed, they did have certain guarding/safety
features, including a metal panel or guard that covered the top of the table and
between the belts that covered the drive shafts and U-joints, and this guard bent
down and around over the edge of the table and under the table to some extent.7
(emphasis added).
Therefore, OSHA, Mr. Call, and Mr. Bennet all agree that the drive shaft was not guarded
under the table as discussed above. Despite these opinions, the conclusory argument was made
at the summary judgment hearing that the drive shaft under the table was guarded “to some
extent.” 8 Then, this argument changed on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, again without
evidentiary support, that the “drive shafts on the picking table were covered by a metal guard”
and therefore “Crookham is unaware as to how the metal guard was avoided and Ms. Gomez got
caught in the picking table.” 9 Of interest, Respondent cited to its own discovery responses as
support for this position.10 In this regard, even the discovery response cited to as support for
Respondent’s position that the drive shafts were completely guarded are contradictory to that
position:
INTERROGATORY NO. 19: Please describe in complete detail all facts
which form the basis of your affirmative defense that: “Plaintiffs claimed or
alleged damages, if any, are the result of Ms. Gomez’s own negligence.” By this
interrogatory, Plaintiff seeks the facts, persons with knowledge, and any
documents which support this affirmative defense.

7

Tr., p. 8, ll. 16-21.
Id.
9
Respondent’s Brief, p. 3.
10
R, p. 97.
8
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ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 19. Defendant incorporates its
general objections. Defendant also objects to this interrogatory on the grounds
that, as framed, it seeks disclosure of attorney work product as well as documents
and things prepared in anticipation of litigation by a party or a party’s
representative. Subject to and without waiving these objections, at the time of the
accident, the drive shafts on the picking table were partially covered by a metal
guard. Because no one witnessed the circumstances leading up to the accident,
Defendant is unaware as to how the metal guard was avoided and Francisca
Gomez got caught in the picking table. (emphasis added). 11
Based upon Respondent’s own discovery responses, the argument that the drive shafts
were completely covered by a metal guard and therefore Respondent lacks knowledge as to how
Ms. Gomez could have got her hair caught in the uncovered drive shaft is patently false. There is
no reasonable explanation offered by Respondent’s as to why their position on metal guarding
and knowledge of metal guarding changed without the addition of new evidence between the
summary judgment hearing and subsequent briefing to the Idaho Supreme Court.
The next and related factual assertion made by Crookham that lacks any merit is that
“Crookham is unaware as to how the metal guard was avoided and Ms. Gomez got caught in the
picking table.” 12 Again, as discussed above, there was no metal guarding under the picking table
covering the drive shaft and the notion that the drive shaft was covered was created for the first
time as part of Respondent’s brief.

To be blunt, Respondent is going to great lengths in

Respondent’s Brief to put its head in the sand regarding Ms. Gomez’s cause of death.
Respondent even acknowledged that Ms. Gomez was “cleaning a picking table when her hair
was caught on the table’s drive shaft.” 13
11

Id.
Respondent’s Brief, p. 3.
13
Id.
12
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Finally, Crookham alleges that “no one in the Scancore room witnessed the
circumstances leading up to the accident,” 14 but the reality is that Ms. Gomez’s movement in the
room was actually taped on video surveillance and clearly shows Ms. Gomez in the process of
cleaning the table with a compressed air wand just prior to her death. 15
Ultimately, Respondent is blatantly trying to push heavily contradicted and even brand
new factual assertions that are not supported by the evidence. The question is why? The answer
to that question is strategy. Respondent is in a legal fight over what it knew and what it knows
as a result of the Exclusive Remedy Rule challenge. As a result, Respondent is attempting to
offer so-called “factual statements” that bring Respondent’s knowledge into a positive light. In
short, Respondent wants this Court to go down the argument trail that Respondent could not have
had actual or consciously disregarded knowledge if it did not have any knowledge at all and
somehow Ms. Gomez’s cause of death was just a big mystery. Respondent made this strategy
clear on page 32 of its brief when it stated “. . . that Respondent did not have actual knowledge
that cleaning the picking table would cause injury or death of any employee” so it “could not
consciously disregard knowledge that it did not have.” 16
For this strategy to work, Respondent needed to be consistent with its statements
regarding its own knowledge about the table it designed, built, and operated. Respondent has
failed to stay consistent with regards to its knowledge on one of the most fundamental issues in
this case—machine guarding. Mr. Bennet testified that the machine guarding did not extend

14

Id.
R, p. 472 (Surveillance Video).
16
Respondent’s Brief, p. 32.
15
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under the table to cover the drive shaft. 17 As discussed above, Mr. Bennet’s testimony in this
regard is consistent with the OSHA findings as well as the conclusions reached by Mr. Call.
Despite this, Respondent took the position, as discussed above, in its formal discovery responses
that the drive shafts were “partially covered.” This was the argument asserted to the District
Court during oral arguments during the summary judgment hearing. Now, before the Idaho
Supreme Court, Respondent has changed the position to state that the drive shafts were
completely guarded. So, at this point in time, Respondent has set forth three different versions of
its knowledge of the metal guarding around the drive shaft: 1) the drive shaft under the table was
not covered; 2) the drive shaft was partially covered; and 3) the drive shaft was completely
covered.
It is important to note that this discrepancy was expressly pointed out to the District
Court during oral arguments:
Something I would also like to point out that was mentioned even in oral
arguments today way—it’s actually different than what was in briefing from the
defense—this acknowledgment that the sheet metal came over the top of the
machine and down the side and then the exact words were “to some extent
underneath the machine.” The briefing would lead you to I think it almost looked
like, well, yeah, it totally covered it, but it didn’t. It just came under to some
extent, and left the drive shaft exposed. The person—the people that have the
greatest knowledge of that exposure would be the person that designed and
manufactured it which is Crookham. This wasn’t designed by some other
company, and they just didn’t see it. They literally are the people that failed to
put the sheet metal over the top of the drive shaft. Crookham did it. 18
Clearly, the District Court was presented with a question of fact regarding Respondent’s
knowledge of whether or not the drive shaft under the table was guarded.
17
18

R, p. 645 (at p. 88, ll. 19-21).
Tr., p. 41, ll. 6-23.
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This major

discrepancy in Respondent’s assertions regarding its own knowledge of machine guarding was
expressly stated to the District Court. 19 Despite the existence of a significant question of fact
regarding Respondent’s knowledge of the literal mechanism of Ms. Gomez’s death, the District
Court granted summary judgment to Respondent and even granted costs to Respondent. 20 This
was reversible error committed by the District Court. The District Court should have denied
summary judgment to the Respondent and allowed this matter to move forward to a jury trial to
determine the extent of Respondent’s knowledge regarding the mechanism of Ms. Gomez’s
death. Furthermore, given this significant question of fact, the District Court certainly should not
have ordered Ms. Gomez’s family to foot the bill for Respondent’s costs.
Frankly, it is difficult to understand how the District Court could have made
determinations in Respondent’s favor regarding Respondent’s actual or consciously disregarded
knowledge when Respondent itself cannot get its story straight regarding its own knowledge of
the machine guarding around the very drive shaft that killed Ms. Gomez.
B. Death and injury are not synonymous under the Workers’ Compensation Act.
Respondent asserts that although I.C. § 72-201 does not include the word death in it, it
nonetheless applies to death claims because death and injury are synonymous under the Act. 21 In
this regard, Appellants recognize that I.C. § 72-102(9) defines death under the Act as “death
resulting from an injury or occupational disease.” However, that definition merely means that
for a death to be considered industrial in nature, it must have arisen from an industrial injury or

19

Id.
R, pp. 720-730, 747-748.
21
Respondent’s Brief, p. 10.
20
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occupational disease. In other words, in practice, a workers’ compensation surety is not liable to
pay death benefits pursuant to I.C. § 72-413 unless the death had industrial origins. In the
alternative, if the death arose from something else, like non-industrial cancer, then the death
would not meet the definition. In short, the plain language of I.C. § 72-102(9) certainly does not
mean that the Idaho legislature intended for injury to be inclusive or otherwise synonymous with
death throughout the Act. In this regard, if the Idaho legislature intended for death and injury
claims to be synonymous and inclusive of each other under the Act, it would be expected that the
definition of “injury” or “personal injury” would include language expressly stating that those
terms are inclusive of death claims.
In this regard, I.C. § 72-102(18) defines “injury” as a “personal injury caused by an
accident arising out of and in the course of employment covered by the worker’s compensation
law.”(emphasis added). I.C.§ 72-102(18)(c) also states that “injury” and “personal injury”
includes “only an injury caused by an accident, which results in violence to the physical structure
of the body” and does not include “an occupational disease and only such nonoccupational
diseases as result directly form an injury.”(emphases added). I.C. § 72-102(18)(b) defines
“accident” as an “unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or untoward event,
connected with the industry in which it occurs, and which can be reasonably located as to time
when and place where it occurred, causing an injury.”(emphasis added).
Clearly, the definitions of injury, personal injury, and even accident do not include death,
let alone even mention death. That makes sense because being injured and being dead are
completely different things.
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C. I.C. §§ 72-201, 72-209, and 72-211 are not “mirror images” of each other.
Respondent further asserts that I.C. § 72-201, I.C. § 72-209, and I.C. § 72-211 are to be
interpreted in pari materia (in light of each other) “since they have common purpose for
comparable events or items.” 22 Appellants disagree.
I.C. § 72-201 was formerly codified as I.C. § 72-102. I.C. § 72-102, before being
amended and renumbered to become the modern day I.C. § 72-201, stated as follows:
72-102. Declaration of police power.—The common law system governing the
remedy of workmen against employers for injuries received in industrial and
public work is inconsistent with modern industrial conditions. The administration
of the common law system in such cases has produced the result that little of the
cost to the employer has reached the injured workman, and that little at large
expense to the public. The remedy of the workman has been uncertain, slow and
inadequate. Injuries in such employments formerly occasional have become
frequent and inevitable. The welfare of the state depends upon its industries, and
even more upon the welfare of its wage-workers. The state of Idaho, therefore,
exercising herein its police and sovereign power, declares that all phases of the
premises are withdrawn from private controversy, and sure and certain relief for
injured workmen and their families and dependents is hereby provided regardless
of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding or
compensation, except as is otherwise provided in this act, and to that end all civil
actions and civil causes of action for such personal injuries, and all jurisdiction of
the courts of the state over such causes are hereby abolished, except as is in this
act provided.(emphases added).
As noted above, I.C. § 72-102 was subsequently redrafted and codified as I.C. § 72-201,
which states as follows:
72-201. Declaration of Police Power. The common law system governing the
remedy of workmen against employers for injuries received and occupational
diseases contracted in industrial and public work is inconsistent with modern
industrial conditions. The welfare of the state depends upon its industries and
even more upon the welfare of its wageworkers. The state of Idaho, therefore,
22

Respondent’s Brief, p. 10.
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exercising herein its police and sovereign power, declares that all phases of the
premises are withdrawn from private controversy, and sure and certain relief for
injured workmen and their families and dependents is hereby provided regardless
of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding or
compensation, except as is otherwise provided in this act, and to that end all civil
actions and civil causes of action for such personal injuries and all jurisdiction of
the courts of the state over such causes are hereby abolished, except as in this law
provided.(emphases added).
Of interest, neither I.C. § 72-102 or I.C. § 72-201 expressly included death claims. I.C. §
72-102 only expressly applied to injury claims. As occupational diseases came into being, the
Idaho legislature expressly added occupational disease claims to the injury claims when I.C. §
72-201 was enacted. However, death claims were not added. As a result, no version of the police
power statute throughout the history of the Act ever included death claims.
The legislative history of I.C. § 72-203 is also important to this appeal. I.C. § 72-203 was
the precursor statute to I.C. § 72-211 and stated as follows:
72-203. Right to compensation exclusive.—The rights and remedies herein
granted to an employee on account of a personal injury for which he is entitled to
compensation under this act shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such
employee, his personal representatives, dependents, or next of kin, at common
law or otherwise, on account of such injury. Employer, who hire workmen within
this state to work outside of the state, may agree with such workmen that the
remedies under this act shall be exclusive as regards injuries received outside this
state by accident arising out of and in the course of such employment; and all
contracts of hiring in this state shall be presumed to include such an
agreement.(emphases added).
This statute was subsequent redrafted and codified as I.C. § 72-211, which states as follows:
72-211. Exclusiveness of Employee’s Remedy. Subject to the provisions of
section 72-223, [Idaho Code] the rights and remedies herein granted to an
employee on account of an injury or occupational disease for which he is entitled
to compensation under this law shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the
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employee, his personal representatives, dependents or next of kin, at common law
or otherwise, on account of such injury or disease.(emphases added).
Neither I.C. § 72-203 nor I.C. § 72-211 were expressly applicable to death claims. I.C. §
72-203 applied to injury claims by injured workmen and occupational diseases were added with
the enactment of I.C. § 72-211—death claims were not added.
In reality, death claims were not expressly added into the statutory fray of the Exclusive
Remedy Rule until the adoption of I.C. § 72-209 in 1971. No prior version of I.C. § 72-209
existed before 1971. This was a brand new creation by the Idaho State Legislature.
The problems with the Idaho Legislature’s new I.C. § 72-209 statute is that it is not the
“mirror image” of I.C. § 72-201 nor 72-211. It does not fit within the historical framework of the
exclusive remedy rule analysis – it is very much on a new island by itself. It expressly applies to
death claims where the other two statutes do not. It has a lot of third party language in it that the
other statutes do not. It contains rules about damage caps and exemptions that the other statutes
do not have. There is odd language in it that the statute may only be applicable “to the aggressor
and shall not be imputable to the employer unless provoked or authorized by the employer.” The
other statutes do not contain any such qualifying language. Also, I.C. § 72-209 contains a lot of
language dealing with the liability of a surety that the other statutes do not have. In many
respects, I.C. § 72-209 is so different and such a massive departure from any prior historical
statutory language under the Act that there really is no historical insight or comparison into its
applicability prior to 1971. Finally, by its inclusion of death, it provides greater liability
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protection to an employer/surety than the exclusive remedies identified in I.C. § 72-211 or the
express grant of police power jurisdiction granted in I.C. § 72-201.
Ultimately, I.C. § 72-209, as it has been historically applied, is a cumbersome, vague,
jumbled, and unique statute that does not “mirror” any other statutes.
D. Income benefits for personal injury and death benefits are entirely separate
types of benefits.
Respondent asserts that the income benefits paid to an injured worker and the death
benefits paid to the dependents of a deceased worker are one and the same and this “is further
evidence of the Legislative intent that claims involving death be included within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Worker’s Compensation Law and the Idaho Commission’s exclusive
jurisdiction.” 23 This argument lacks merit because income benefits for personal injuries and
death benefits are two completely different types of benefits.
It is accurate that the definition of “income benefits” found at I.C. § 72-102 includes
“payments provided for or made under the provisions of this law to . . . dependents in case of
death . . .” 24 However, that is not the end of the analysis. If you are a worker who is injured but
not killed, you have an entirely separate scheme of rules that apply to your ability to collect
income benefits from the Employer/Surety than a worker who actually died. If you are injured,
an Employer/Surety does not have to pay any income benefits for the first five (5) days that the
worker is off work as a result of the injury. 25 After the waiting period, and only if the
Employer/Surety determines that you are actually entitled to income benefits, the income
23

Respondent’s Brief, pp. 16-17.
I.C. § 72-102 (16).
25
I.C. § 72-402
24
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benefits payments start. Those payments are then statutorily controlled. 26 Pursuant to I.C. § 72408, an injured worker will receive a partial percentage of their time of injury wage in an amount
of sixty-seven percent (67%) of the average weekly wage for the first fifty-two (52) weeks and
then sixty-seven percent (67%) of the average weekly state wage thereafter. 27 These benefits are
only available during the “period of recovery.” 28
Death benefits are statutorily controlled by several completely different statutes. An
analysis of these statutes leads to the singular conclusion that income benefits for personal injury
and death benefits are not the same “type of benefit” as asserted by Respondent. First of all, to
obtain death benefits, you must actually qualify as a dependent. 29 The only individuals who
qualify for death benefits are the following:
A) Children who are unmarried and under eighteen (18) years old and incapable of selfsupport or up to twenty-three (23) years old if the children are full-time students.
B) The widow of the deceased worker, but only if the widow was living with the
deceased or justifiably living separate from the deceased or dependent upon the
deceased.
C) A parent or grandparent, but only if they are dependent upon the deceased.
D) Grandchildren, brothers, and sisters, but only if they are under the age of eighteen
(18) years of age or incapable of self-support and dependent upon the deceased. 30

26

I.C. § 72-408
Id.
28
Id.
29
I.C. § 72-410.
30
Id.
27
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The general identification of classes of dependents in I.C. § 72-410 is then clarified in
I.C. § 72-412. Widows only qualify for death benefits until the widow dies, remarries, or stays a
widow for five-hundred (500) weeks or less, which is roughly 9.5 years. 31 Children’s benefits are
particularly complicated. As noted above, children must be unmarried and under the age of 18 or
otherwise in school. However, handicap or special needs children are entitled to benefits after
that time period but only for 500 weeks, but the Employer/Surety deducts the time period of
payments already made from that 500 weeks. 32 The following is a very sad example of this
statutory scheme at work:
Employee (father) dies in an industrial accident leaving behind a four (4)
year old daughter with severe mental disabilities that require extensive medical
treatment and professional care. Employee father knew and planned on before his
death for his daughter to likely live with him until the daughter’s death so he
could care for her and pay for her medical care. Employee father dies and this
child receives death benefits after the father’s death until the age of eighteen (18).
At eighteen (18), this child, despite continuing to be completely dependent upon
death benefits to pay for medical and professional care, is now on her own.
Also, keep in mind that the extension of benefits to twenty-three (23) years old for fulltime students is strictly to the age of 23. If the child reaches the age of 23 during their junior year
of college, the child will not receive any additional benefits through the remainder of college
and/or graduate school. 33 It is unknown why the Idaho legislature based death benefits upon an
arbitrary age of twenty-three (23) and not upon school completion. Although it may make some
sense that college should be completed by the age of 23 for purposes of death benefits, it is not
typically plausible to complete a graduate degree by 23.
31

I.C. § 72-412(1)
I.C. § 72-412 (2)
33
I.C. § 72-412(3)
32
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Ultimately, widows and children have their payments of death benefits further limited by
IC § 72-413. Pursuant to this statute, if a worker dies and leaves a qualifying dependent spouse
but no other dependents, that surviving spouse will receive forty-five (45%) of the deceased
worker’s average weekly wage. 34 The worker would get sixty-seven (67%) of the average
weekly wage for an injury as noted above. 35 In short, the childless widow of a deceased worker
will arbitrarily receive twenty-two percent (22%) less in death benefits than an injured worker
receives in income benefits.
If the deceased worker leaves both qualifying dependent children and a widow, then the
widow will still receive forty-five percent (45%) of the average weekly wage, but the children
will receive far less. In this regard, each qualifying dependent child will receive five percent
(5%) of the average weekly state wage, but only up to three children. 36 Obviously, this means
that several of the children of large families get no benefits despite the death of a parent and
despite the fact that they otherwise qualify (unmarried, under the age of 18, and dependent upon
deceased parent).
The Idaho legislature found it necessary to treat the children of single parents even worse.
Single parents to several children should be very careful not to die at work because all your kids
will get is the following: One child will get just thirty (30%) of the average state wage and each

34

I.C. § 72-413(1)
See I.C. § 72-408
36
I.C. § 72-413 (2)
35
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additional child will get just ten percent (10%) and never to exceed sixty percent (60%) of the
average state wage. 37
The point of going through this analysis is to point out a simple fact: income benefits to
an injured worker and death benefits to dependents are very different. Whereas income benefits
are based upon medical restrictions and the period of recovery, death benefits are devoid of any
similar considerations. Regardless of the financial and/or medical needs of a widow or dependent
children or qualifying others, the amounts paid in death benefits are lacking in compassion and
based solely upon the combination of mathematical formulas, dependent status, and an arbitrary
500 week end point – that’s it. What matters is that the dependents can prove dependency, but
the Idaho legislature did not deem it necessary for the Employer/Surety to pay for whatever that
dependency is. In short, the Idaho legislature literally created a system where the fourth (4th)
child in a large family who has cancer and was wholly dependent upon the income from the
deceased worker to pay for treatment would not qualify for any death benefits at all. Now, let’s
take that example a step further. Let’s say that this is a six (6) child household, all the kids under
eighteen (18), and the widow has been a stay at home mom for fifteen (15) years. This poor mom
is now going to have to try to pay for the lives of herself and all her children on a personal
income of forty-five percent (45%) of her husband’s average weekly wage and she will even lose
that minimum financial support arbitrarily in a little over nine (9) years. She cannot afford to go
to school, pay for daycare for several children, cannot find a good paying job with a stay-athome gap in her resume, and cannot afford the mortgage on the house because the little bit of
37
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money she gets in death benefits is going toward putting some food on the table and not much
else. This poor mom has lost her husband, is going to lose her home, cannot afford healthcare
insurance premiums for seven (7) people, and is going to end up on welfare and/or homeless.
This is the ugly and dark side of death benefits and the Exclusive Remedy Rule. This is
the rarely spoken of reality faced by the families crushed by the so-called “grand compromise”
that the Idaho Worker’s Compensation Act sought out to achieve. Of all the statutory framework
that exists in the Worker’s Compensation Act, death benefits are likely the most arbitrary, coldly
mathematically calculated, and devoid of any consideration of the financial, medical, and general
well-being of the dependents.
In recognition of the reality of the application of death benefits, Appellants assert that it
was the intent of the Idaho legislature to make the death benefits permissive, not mandatory and
exclusive. In support of this argument, as stated above, the Idaho legislature never expressly
included death claims within the statutory framework of I.C. §§ 72-201, 72-102, 72-203 or 72211. As noted above, the Idaho legislature did not even include death claims within the statutory
definition of “accident” under the Act.
Furthermore, the Idaho legislature, in enacting Idaho’s wrongful death statute, did not
carve out an exception to the applicability of the wrongful death statute in cases involving deaths
from industrial causes. 38 In this regard, I.C. § 5-311, which is entitled “Suit for Wrongful Death
by or Against Heirs or Personal Representatives—Damages” does not contain any language
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stating that it is subject to the Worker’s Compensation Act. 39 Of interest, I.C. § 5-311 was
enacted in 1984, thirteen (13) years after I.C. § 72-413 was enacted. I.C. § 5-311 was
subsequently amended in 2010. Despite being in existence since 1984, created after the 1971
changes to the Worker’s Compensation Act, and despite being amended fairly recently in 2010,
I.C. § 5-311 remains silent on the preclusion of industrial death claims.
E. The District Court failed to define or apply the consciously disregarded
knowledge prong of the Exclusive Remedy Rule.
Respondent asserts that the District Court not only defined the consciously disregarded
knowledge prong of the Exclusive Remedy Rule, but also subsequently correctly applied the
prong to the facts of this case. 40 This is patently false. The District Court, despite being tasked
with doing so, completely failed to define or apply the consciously disregarded knowledge prong
at all. No analysis was performed on what consciously, disregarded, or consciously disregarded
means and certainly no legal authority was offered by either Respondent or the District Court
into the meaning of the words in the context of the Exclusive Remedy Rule. The District Court
also failed to acknowledge the disjunctive nature of the actual knowledge versus consciously
disregarded knowledge language and explain the impact of the disjunctive nature. The District
Court had a responsibility to define the phrase consciously disregarded and apply the facts of this
case to that definition as part of the application of the Exclusive Remedy Rule. It was clear
reversible error for the District Court to find in favor of Crookham’s summary judgment motion
without first undergoing this analysis. Ultimately, the Plaintiffs in the District Court below found
39
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themselves on the losing end of a summary judgment motion even though the District Court did
not even attempt to define and apply all of the applicable legal elements of the Exclusive
Remedy Rule.
F. The Runcorn decision is distinguishable and otherwise not applicable.
Respondent asserts that the Idaho Supreme Court held in Runcorn v. Shearer Lumber
Prod., 107 Idaho 389, 690 P.2d 324 (1984) that the “subject to” language contained in Idaho
Code §§ 72-209 and 72-211 refers specifically and solely to statutory employer disputes
concerning whether a statutory employer is considered an employer or a third party. 41 In this
regard, Respondent’s view of the Runcorn decision is far too limited. Although the Runcorn
decision concerned itself with a statutory employer analysis, it does not then follow that the
“subject to” language at issue is therefore only applicable to statutory employer cases. Rather,
the clear implication of the disputed “subject to” language is that it applies to the entirety of the
third party statute found at I.C. § 72-223 – not just statutory employer cases. In any event, the
Runcorn decision is not applicable to the current matter before the Idaho Supreme Court.
Runcorn involved personal injury, not death. Also, the main focus of the case was upon the
statutory employer dispute and not upon the application of the elements of the Exclusive Remedy
Rule.
G. Appellants did not raise a new issue on appeal.
Respondent asserts that Appellants raised a new issue on appeal by arguing that Ms.
Gomez’s death does not meet the definition of accident as defined by the Act and therefore the
41
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Industrial Commission does not have jurisdiction.42 Respondent’s argument in this regard lacks
merit. Appellants raised the following issue on appeal: Whether the Court erred in finding that
Respondent met the burden that Ms. Gomez’s death is covered by the Worker’s Compensation
Act. 43 In this regard, Appellants asserted in Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment that Ms. Gomez was not working within the scope of her employment at the
time she was killed. 44 This argument necessitates an analysis of the definition of “accident” as
set forth at I.C. § 72-102(18)(b) because an accident requires an injury to be “connected with the
industry in which it occurs.” The argument made at the District Court was that Ms. Gomez was
killed while engaging in an activity that was not connected with her industry. 45 As a result, her
death did not meet the definition of an “accident” because 1) she was engaged in activity at the
time of her death that was not connected to her industry; and 2) she died in the process. The
definition of “accident” under the Act only expressly applies to industrial injuries that are
connected with the industry in which those injuries occurred. Therefore, Ms. Gomez’s death did
not arise out of an in the course of “any employment covered by the worker’s compensation
law.”
For the reasons set forth above, Appellanst did not raise a new issue on appeal. Rather,
Appellants clarified and reiterated the argument made to the District Court.
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H. The District Court’s award of costs should be overturned.
As noted above, the District Court granted summary judgment to Crookham without
defining the consciously disregarded prong of the Exclusive Remedy Rule or applying the facts
of this case to that specific prong. As a result, the District Court determined that Crookham was
the prevailing party without engaging in a complete legal analysis or factual application to the
appropriate legal elements of the Exclusive Remedy Rule.
Furthermore, as discussed above, the District Court was presented with a significant
question of fact regarding Respondent’s knowledge of the machine guarding around the drive
shaft that caused Ms. Gomez’s death. As stated above, Respondent’s statements regarding its
knowledge on this fundamental issue have been very inconsistent. Despite this significant
question of fact caused by Respondent’s inconsistent statements regarding its own knowledge,
the District Court granted summary judgment to Respondent and awarded it costs.
Under these circumstances, the District Court’s award of costs to Crookham should be
overturned. Generally, in order for the prevailing party to be entitled to an award of fees and
costs, the “party seeking the fees must be the prevailing party and the losing party must have
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.” City of Osborne v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 909,
277 P.3d 353, 356 (2012). In the current matter, Appellants have not “acted without a reasonable
basis in fact or law.” In fact, Appellants presented a genuine issue of fact on the material issue of
Respondent’s knowledge to the District Court. Despite this, the District Court failed to analyze
Respondent’s inconsistent statements and found no issue of fact and then failed to define and
apply the consciously disregarded knowledge prong of the Exclusive Remedy Rule.
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Although Respondent was the prevailing party at the District Court, it did not prevail as a
result of Appellants setting forth unreasonable legal or factual arguments. Rather, Respondent
prevailed after the District Court committed reversible error.
Again, under these circumstances and the holding in City of Osborne, the District Court’s
award of costs to Respondent should be overturned.
I. Appellants are entitled to fees and costs related to this appeal.
Appellants are entitled to an award of fees and costs pursuant to I.C. § 12-121, I.R.C.P.
54(e), and I.A.R. 41 because Respondent has defended this appeal unreasonably based upon
inconsistent statements it has made regarding its knowledge of machine guarding of the drive
shaft that killed Ms. Gomez as discussed at length above. 46 Respondent’s inconsistent statements
regarding its own knowledge about machine guarding and the cause of Ms. Gomez’s death,
especially the assertion made without any evidentiary support that the drive shaft under the table
was completely guarded, were also made without any foundation. These inconsistent statements
have not only created a question of fact for a jury as to Respondent’s knowledge, but have also
significantly hindered and otherwise prejudiced Appellants’ ability to conduct an investigation
into Respondent’s “actual or consciously disregarded knowledge” as required by the Exclusive
Remedy Rule. In short, Respondent’s inconsistent statements have had a direct impact on
Appellants’ ability to meet their burden and played a direct role in Appellants’ loss at summary
judgment at the District Court.
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Should the Idaho Supreme Court determine that Appellants are the prevailing party on
appeal, Appellants would also be entitled to fees and costs pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d) and 1.A.R.
41 because I.R.C.P. 54(d) expressly allows for costs and fees to be awarded as a matter of right
to the prevailing party.
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